The Ypres Times.
35
on return from Italy, all but two left us, and in their places we got the tired and sad
survivors of the Divisions from the 3rd and 5th Armiesthe troops on whom the weight
of the German advance had fallen. Poor fellows. They had indeed had a hard time and
had earned a rest. Alas, they were not to get it. Our line was very thin, as may be
imagined. As an instance I recollect that the Messines-Wytschaete ridge, instead of
being held by four strong Australian Divisions, was held by three weak and tired British
Brigades from the South. By this time we were receiving information of a probable
German offensive in the North. It seemed more likely that it would come against the
left of the 1st Army about Lens than against us. As a matter of fact it came on April 9th
against the Portuguesethe left Corps of the 1st Arm}-, south of Armentières, on the
ver\- day before the Portuguese were to be relieved by British troops from the south. In
fact the XI Corps on the left of 1st Army was to come under the 2nd Army as soon as
this relief was completed. This German advance met with success and almost at once
the right of our Second Army became embroiled. We then had as bad a month as I ever
remember. After all those years of security it seemed incredible that places like
Armentières, Nieppe, I'loegsteert Wood, Bailleul, Bac St. Maur, Fleurbaix, etc., could
ever fall into enemy hands. Yet that was happening hourly and daily. As we knew
later, the German Commander-in-Chief had scored a bigger success than he expected and
had persuaded the German High Command to give him more and more troops. The goal
of the Channel Ports was all he saw. He influenced the High Command. The latter
succumbed to the strategy which has led many a campaign to disaster. The trcops
employed were drawn off their main objective. The pressure about Amiens lessened—
the wedge between the French and British Armies got more blunt.
If we could only hold in the North the tide was bound to turn in our favour, but
could we Our resources were indeed slender. All the troops or almost all, had just been'
through a gruelling time in the South. There were no fresh troops to come. Units were
formed of men who had just been through the terrible experience of retreat and drafts
of inexperienced men hurried from home. All had suffered very severe casualties. Units
had never had a chance to re-form. I remember well a Staff Conference one morning at
Cassel. We were discussing the situation when an A.D.C. came in with a message to say
that the Germans had captured the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge our Ridge, which ten
months before we had captured with such pride. Here were we, the same Commander
and Staff, sitting in the same room and places in which we had planned that successful
operation, being told it had all gone. I watched the Army Commander's face. I wondered
what the effect on him would be. I knew what it meant to him. I learnt a lot in the
next few seconds. I saw a great man show again what a great Commander he was. I
saw him in a real crisis. He never said a word, but told me to continue with what I was
saying on something quite different when the A.D.C. interrupted.
Messines was indeed a loss, but more was to follow, including Keimnel. Where
was it going to stop The enemy got into the village of Locre, at the foot of the Scheepen-
berg. Still we held the Passchendaele Salient and Ypres. I used to think of the Army
Commander's reply at Montreuil. Give up Passchendaele. Not I!
Our Second Army line was a ver}- curious and dangerous one at this time. Stil'
keeping our fist out in the Passchendaele Salient with the enemy almost astride our
communications. The French sent us reinforcements by motor lorry and how glad we
were to get them. The French Divisions were under the command of General de Mitry.
I remember Marshal Foch coming up to see us and holding a Conference at St. Marie Cappeh
With what activity back lines were reconnoitred and prepared. What splendid
courage His Majesty the King of the Belgians displayed on our left. He was determined
to hold on if attacked. How perfectly heroic our troops were. Divisions were mixed up.
It was most difficult to extricate and sort them. On more than one occasion was our
old Army line broken Every time I told the Army Commander that our line was broken
