The Ypres Times.
117
called it, swayed and bent and staggered under overwhelming attack and somehow
held on. What the actual disparity of forces on the two sides was it is difficult to say.
Counting battalions only, the Germans outnumbered us in the'proportion of about nine
to five. But that tells very little of the story. Almost every unit on the Allied side
was exhausted and much under strength at the beginning of the battle and was a mere
skeleton at the end. The German units were generally new and of full strength. Falken-
hayn himself says The majority of formations which advanced to the new struggle
were quite fresh." We know that the total force at the disposal of Sir John French
numbered about 100,000 men. Against them the Germans threw, it is calculated, 432
battalions, which must have represented a bayonet strength of more than 400,000. Nor
were they inferior levies. In the later stages of the battle troops of the Prussian Guard
were flung into the attack and the German Emperor himself was at hand to see them
break through. They had all the advantage of being fresh instead of tired out." They
had the advantage of position, and could select their points of attack. They enormously
exceeded us in artillery, especially in heavy artillery and machine-guns, and in every
detail of equipment. Falkenhayn makes many excuses for their failurechiefly in short
comings of leadership. But the real explanation, if hardly an excuse, is that the Germans
commanders never guessed how light the defence before them was that and the gallantry
of our men. And when all excuses and explanations are made, the miracle remains.
From all the confused welter along those 40 miles of front that went on day after day,
one other incident can be selected as illustrating the character of the fightingthe charge
of the Household Brigade, six days later, farther to the right of the line, which some
authorities consider more brilliant and no less crucial than the incident of the Worcesters.
Ford Cavan is generally, but mistakenly, credited with having given the order for*
this attack. Cavan had had command of the 4th Guards Brigade of the 2nd Division
but two of his battalionsthe 2nd Grenadier and 1st Irish Guardshad, as we have seen,
been drafted into the Divisional Reserve and it was in command of these two detached
battalions, in combination with the 1st K.R.R. and three companies of the Royal Berk-
shires, that Cavan was sent downlent," as the phrase wasto help Bulfin, who com
manded the 2nd Brigade (1st Division) near Klein Zillebeke, where the situation was
critical. When Bulfin was wounded Cavan succeeded to his command and his two united
brigades were now known as Cavan's Force," and had practically the status of a
division.
A detachment of French troops, under Moncey, held a short stretch of trenches on
Cavan's right, but extremely heavy attacks on the morning of November 6th forced them
to give way, and on the open flank of the Irish Guards the enemy was again pushing through
with nothing to check him. To try to stop the gap Haig sent Kavanagh with troops of
the Household Brigade. Cavan, knowing every inch of the ground, was able to advise
how best the troops could advance to the attack without exposing themselves. The
attack, most gallantly delivered (as in the case of the Worcesters, with the bayonet on
the victorious enemy's right flank), was entirely successful too successful, alas! for,
as brave men will, after the attackers had won back the lost trenches they pushed on
against the main German positions. Then it was that that glorious fellow," Hugh
Dawnay, commanding the 2nd Fife Guards, Gordon Wilson, commanding the Blues, with
other gallant men who could ill be spared, were killed. But the line which they restored
held without afterwards yielding a yard till the end of the battle 15 days later.
It is inevitable that one should tell of this or any other battle chiefly in terms of
the infantry, and one thinks first of all of Haig's and Pulteney's men of the 1st and 3rd
Corps. But nothing could have been more glorious than the role played by the cavalry
throughout the fight, whether Byng's 3rd Division or Allenby's Corps, which, early in
October, had been split into the 1st and 2nd Divisions under Hugh Gough and De Fisle.
Sir John French has recorded how, on that terrible November 1st, with hardly 2,000 rifles,
the two latter divisions, already tested and strained to the utmost, suffered the onslaught
of what has been computed as more than two German Army Corps." The gunners, with
