218 The Ypres 1 imes. The battle was to be a full-dress affair, and, in order to ensure success, troops and guns were concentrated on a scale such as the war had as yet not witnessed. The artillery bombardment, that herald of attacks insisted upon by the old school and bitterly resented by the new, was to conform to the gigantic scheme, and the eight days' counter-battery work, begun on July 7, was to be followed by sixteen days' intense bombardmentwhile on July 3 the attack was to be supported by the three Brigades of the Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corpsthe name under which the Tank Corps was then camouflaged consisting of 216 fighting machines. A reconnaissance carried out by the Heavy Branch, M.G.C., had declared the terrain north of Messines as unfit for tanksbut such was the pressure of circumstances that the opinion of experts was swept aside. It, therefore, remained for the tank crews and commanders to make the best of the worst conditions under which these machines had ever been, or were ever likely to be, called upon to fight. Before proceeding further it may be of interest to glance at a most interesting feature of the Third Battle of Ypres, but one which, on account of its dependance on the success of the whole, never took place, namely, the landing upon the Flanders coast at a plage between Nieuport and Ostend. The sea-front is protected by a high concrete wall, on the top of which runs the esplanade, and beyond are the villas, hotels and cafés of the little coast resort. Barbed wire and gun and machine-gun emplacements had converted this part of the coast into a veritable fortress, and a landing became a feasible proposition only with the invention of the tanks, which were to take the leading róle in the attempt, for they were to haul guns and supplies over the concrete wall in the face of the expected heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. A division of artillery, several batteries of field-guns, and howitzers, some engineers and nine Mark IV. tanks were to form the attacking force, which was to be towed to the shore on huge barges, 700 feet long, by monitors, and a landing was to be effected under cover of smoke and a heavy bombardment from the warships of the Dover Patrol. Suffice to say that, though the attacking force was seasoned to its duties by continued practice and was waiting in Dunkirk harbour at the end of July, the failure of the main attack to capture Passchendaele Ridge within the allotted time (for it was upon success there that the sea operation depended) brought about the breaking up of the force, and the idea of a landing upon this part of the coast, an idea which continually intrigued many minds, was definitely abandoned. But revenons a nos moutons, and, in as few words as possible, let us try to picture the task which the tanks were called upon to accomplish in the Salient. The nature of the grounda reclaimed marshwas such that even in the best of weather the high explosive shells tapped the moisture under the surface and shell holes became mere pits of mud and water. In rainy weather this part of the country, now no longer protected by the well- cared-for drainage system which existed in times of peace, became waterlogged, and men, guns and transport, straying from the scarcely distinguishable and heavily shelled roads, sank in the slush and often disappeared from view. In such a country the enemy had not continued his impregnable Hindenburg defence he relied partly on nature and partly on a new contrivance, the pill box," to break up any offensive against his front* whilst the ground between these concrete forts was lightly held by small parties of infantry. Two other well-known features of the Salient were the high ground which surrounds Ypres on north, east and south which was held by the enemy, and from which any movement in or about our lines, unless carried out by night, came under his direct observation and attention and, secondly, the entrance to the Salient which was narrowed down to such a degree that the few roads at our disposal were overburdened with traffic, without the addition of tanks, and any mishap to one of these on a highway during the battleand they could move only on the roads,caused serious dislocation and loss, for the resulting congestion attracted a heavier bombardment from the enemy. The initial stages of an attack entailed tremendous work on the part of the tank personnel, and in view of the importance of the battle every expendable ounce of energy

HISTORISCHE KRANTEN

The Ypres Times (1921-1936) | 1923 | | pagina 8