RATIONING A WAR BY AIR.
14
Tuk Ypres Times.
War and necessity are each great teachers together, they compel initiative and
invention. Thus when communication was interrupted on the troubled surface of the
earth it was renewed in the air.
When the beleaguered garrison of Kut-al-Amarah had reached the extremity of its
endurance and was rapidly approaching the borderland of starvation, the utility of
aircraft as a means of conveying food and supplies through an enemy's blockade was first
demonstrated.
Unhappily, the strength of our aerial arm in Mesopotamia was, at this time, excep
tionally limited, and such aeroplanes as were available had suffered considerably from the
effects of the climate. When, therefore, it was decided to attempt to prolong the siege
of Kut by delivering food by air, only six aeroplanes and three, more or less derelict,
seaplanes could be mustered for the work. Even the stupendous efforts of the pilots,
whose' energies were strained to breaking point and of the mechanics, who waged a never-
ending war against the effect of the climate on machines and engines, could not compensate
for this lack of equipment. The inevitable result followed, and although approximately
17,000 lbs. of food was delivered to Kut in fourteen days, this total fell far short of the
5,000 lbs. required daily to save the garrison from capitulation.
A further factor, which militated very strongly against success, was the arrival, in
Mesopotamia, of a well-equipped squadron of German aircraft, under Captain Schuz.
These machines at once made their presence felt and our unarmed food carrying aeroplanes
provided an easy prey for the fast flying Fokker.
One-sided, as such encounters usually were, with our machines often almost
shot to pieces, the tenacity of British pilots robbed, the enemy of many a decisive
result. Such an instance occurred on the 26th April, 1916. Returning to his aerodrome
after a food dropping mission to Kut, a British pilot suddenly found himself in the
unhappy position of being the target for a Fokker's machine gun. Being unarmed and
alone, he was powerless to reply to the enemy's fire and not only was his machine hit in
over thirty places, but some of the controls were shot away. He himself was wounded
in the left shoulder and left arm, yet he skilfully managed to fly back to the aerodrome,
actually waiting a few minutes to allow another machine to land. He gave in his report
before being lifted out of his machine on to a stretcher and taken to hospital.
Although the decisive results obtained by the enemy's aircraft were few, their menace
was real, and compelled the adoption of protective methods. Thus, of the small number
of aeroplanes that were available, some had to be employed solely as escorts, and the
amount of food that it was possible to convey to Kut was reduced accordingly.
To supply 17,000 human beings, even with the bare necessities of life, is, under normal
circumstances, no small task, but when such necessities have to be conveyed over 24 miles
of tropical country, occupied by the enemy, and dropped from 7,000 feet by well-worn
aeroplanes and seaplanes, the task becomes phenomenal. The Air Service in Mesopotamia
failed to achieve the impossible; yet the lesson was not lost.
It was, however, not until the closing stages of the War that aeroplanes were again
called upon to undertake this task. The fortunes of war had now changed the call for
help no longer came from a beleaguered garrison, but rather from a victorious Allied Army,
who in their vigorous pursuit of the enemy through Belgium had outrun their supplies.
It was on the evening of the 1st October, 1918, when the final battle of Ypres was
drawing to a close, that it became known that the French and Belgian troops, after a four
days' rapid advance, had used up their reserves of food and that the supplies for the
morrow were doubtful. The roads in the region of Houthulst Forest, already torn up by
