174
The Ypres Times.
On August ist I heard from Sir Henry Wilson that the Cabinet Council, which met
during the morning, had not yet taken a definite decision. I telephoned to the Field
Marshal requesting an interview the same evening. He invited me to dinner, asking
me to arrive an hour earlier so that we might discuss the situation. I then had a long
talk with him, in the course of which he gave me clearly to understand, but naturally
without being able to give definite assurances, that the opinion of the majority of the
Cabinet was certainly in favour of intervention on the French coast, and I concluded
from this that England would remain loyal to her friendly agreements. A very cordial
tone was maintained at dinner, and I left Lancaster Gate, if not completely satisfied,
at least reassured.
Lord Ypres' prophecy was fulfilled on August 3rd, and the mobilisation of the British
Army was accelerated by the news of the violation of Belgian territory by the German
troops.
On the following day I worked with Lord French at his headquarters in the Hotel
Metropole in conjunction with his principal coadjutors, Sir A. Murray, Sir William
Robertson, Sir Henry Wilson, and Colonel Harper.
On August 6th an important meeting was held in Lord Kitchener's room at the
War Office. It was a question of deciding where the Expeditionary Force should be
concentrated. At the beginning this Force only consisted of four divisions (First, Second,
Third and Fifth).
I am convinced that Lord Kitchener hesitated to throw the British Regular Divisions
immediately on arrival at the front against the first fine of the German Army, which
he knew to be formidably equipped. His fixed idea, which he stubbornly defended, was
to disembark the divisions in the Amiens district and to give them a few days' training
before going into action. The representatives of the French General Staff, Colonel
Huguet, a commander of the General Staff, and I, strongly insisted that nothing should
be changed in the plans of our General Staffs and that the British troops should be dis
embarked east of Busigny. The discussion lasted several hours, and I may say that Sir
John warmly and loyally supported the French point of view. Finally our opinion
prevailed and Lord Kitchener agreed to concentration in the Wassigny-Le Cateau-
Landrecies zone.
Some might consider the disembarkation of three divisions near an enemy rushing
like a thunderbolt through Belgium full of risks, but I have no hesitation in saying that
if the first contingents of the Expeditionary Force had been concentrated at the start in
the Amiens district, 180 kilometres from the left wing of the French concentration, the
establishment of a connection between the two armies would have been very doubtful,
and the right wing of the German army would have taken advantage of this disposition
to separate them. The presence of the Contemptible British Army at Mons and
Cateau was certainly a disagreeable surprise for the German General Staff. The three
British divisions played an important part. They delayed the advance of the German
right wing, inflicting heavy losses on it. Honour to the brave British officers and men who
laid down their lives in such large numbers on the battlefield for King and Country
By their admirable discipline, fighting as though engaged in peace-time manoeuvres, in
a country which was quite new to them, and of which they did not know the language,
they did their duty nobly in the most difficult circumstances and have enhanced the
reputation of the British soldier of the present day.
The part played by Lord French as Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force
and his relations with the French High Command have been described in a masterly manner
by Marshal Joffre in an article which will appear in the next number of the Army Review
(Quarterly).
I did not see Lord French again until his return to England in 1916, when he was
