THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.
SOME REFLECTIONS.
202
The Ypres Times.
By AN ARTILLERY OFFICER.
We are tolcl by the writers of military history that the Great Commanders were
wont to stud}- their opponent's characters in order to deduce probable lines of action
in time of war.
The opposing commanders in the American Civil War knew each other better than
is usually the case, as many of them had served together in pre-war days. Many
instances can be quoted where they turned this knowledge of each other's characters
to account.
It was difficult to do this in the Great War, at any rate in France and Belgium,
as modern war (on the grand scale) is run by a syndicate, i.e. the general staff. Although
General Ludendorff signed everything emanating from the German general staff, it was
manifestly impossible that his should have been the initiating brain in all innovations.
The Fifth Army, in the autumn of 1917, longed to find out the real author of the
changes in tactics then being made. Although some success was achieved in combating
these tactics, the identity of the officer who really originated the tactical changes in the
German Army in 1917 remains unknown. The story is as follows
By the end of 1916 Germany had realised that she would be unable to compete
with the Allies in the matter of artillery expansion. During the winter of 1916-1917
she therefore devised tactics which were calculated to deprive the Allies of a large part
of the advantage conferred on them by a superior artillery at the same time giving
ever>- scope to the employment of machine-guns, in the use of which the German Army
was at that time ahead of the Allies.
The above was only very vaguely known to the Allies at the time of the battle of
Arras in April, 1917.
This battle was, in its initial stages, very successfultowards the end, however,
our attacks failed to make much headway. They began well, but in the afternoon our
troops were always driven back, and lost most of the ground gained in the morning. It
was obvious that some new factor was at work, but, for the moment, the German secret
was not discovered.
The battle of Messines threw no further light on the matter, as the Germans were
overwhelmed on the first day and being an operation with a strictly limited objective,
it gave no scope for the new German tactics.
The Third Battle of Ypres commenced on July 31st and in general results resembled
the later engagements of the battle of Arras. The attack was repeated on August 15th
with very similar results.
A good deal of information had, however, now come to hand.
It appeared that the enemy were not using large trench garrisons as on the Somme.
The front area was held by machine-guns placed chequer-wise, and protected by numerous
concrete pill-boxes." Our barrage, to a great extent, succeeded in neutralising these
pill boxes," so that in many cases the final objectives had been reached. It was,
however, at this moment that our defeat commenced. Reports agreed in stating that
fresh troops supported by artillery and machine-guns attacked the flanks of our most
advanced infantry and thus gradually forced them to retire.
The following deductions, which proved to be correct, were therefore made
