c
The Ypres Times.
203
Firstly, the hostile infantry had been removed out of the normally dangerous area to safer
and more protected localities, and thus preserved for the counter-attack.
Secondly, machine-guns, having great delaying power, were used to break up the
attack. Comparatively few men, having thus to live in the shelled area, shell proof
accommodation could be provided.
Thirdly, the artillery was placed in great depth, so that batteries were at hand to
accompany the counter-attack.
Fourthly, at the moment of the German counter-attack, our artillery often did not
know the exact locations of our infantry, and was therefore obliged to exercise great
caution. The hostile artillery was not handicapped in this way.
Lastly, it will be observed that the further we penetrated the hostile position, the
further our infantry were from the protection of their own artillery, and the less time
they had for consolidation before the hostile counter-attack was launched.
The enemy had thus admirably succeeded in drawing our teeth while preserving his
own.
The immediate problem was to reverse the tactical situation. This was achieved
as follows
The enemy knew that it took us about three hours to reach an objective 2,000 yards
deep. He thus had two hours in which to move up the counter-attacking divisions.
In this time they might march four miles. They could therefore be located 9,000 yards
from our front line. The places where divisions could be concealed within 9,000 yards
of the front line were not very numerous and could be located on aeroplane photographs.
Our plan was therefore
(1) To attack the hostile troops, withdrawn for the counter attack, in their
bivouacs, prior to zero, by intensive and unexpected bombardmentsand
also during their march up to the battle.
(2) To attack with infantry to a limited objective so that consolidation could
take place well under the observation of our own guns.
The stage would then be well set for the defeat of the counter-attack, thus giving
the opportunity for a more serious attack with a deeper objective.
If the enemy did not counter-attack, the limited objective attack could be repeated
the next day, when the enemy would be practically forced to counter-attack or go.
The one missing link in the chain was that we did not know the route to be followed
by the counter-attack divisions up from their bivouacs. This had been studied on the
map when a most fortunate prisoner was captured. He proved to be an N.C.O. belonging
to a special reconnoitring detachment, whose duty it was to work out the routes which
we were trying to deduce from the map. The next problem was to get the man to talk
freely. Fortunately he was a Prussian and suffered from a rather characteristically
swollen head in military matters. He was engaged in conversation about his work by
an apparently very mild and respectfully appreciative British officer, who was only too
eager to snap up any crumbs of knowledge which the august one might let fall! The
prisoner was even kind enough to explain the whole system of contouring as applied to
military topography, as this was apparently quite a new idea to the interrogating officer
and previously unknown in the British ServiceIn fact partly to get the lesson drummed
into the stupid Britisher's head and partly to add to his own glorification, the prisoner
illustrated his lesson with examples from his own personal experience, and showed how
easy it was for counter-attack divisions to get up if only the routes had been worked out
for them by a man like himself
On September 20th the next attack was launched and gas lay heavily on the routes
so kindly indicated by the Prussian. All possible bivouacs had also been bombarded
for 24 hours. Before the battle it had been appreciated that if our arrangements proved
