THE YPRES TIMES
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he never changed his mind, and bestirred himself to visit his subordinate
commanders to make sure they were carrying out his wishes. Perhaps the best
proof of his value as a Commander-in-Chief was the confidence, through thick
and thin, which the rank and file of the French Army exhibited in him. J o them
he was Père Joffre, the Old Man, who was doing his best for them; and the same
confidence in him was gradually developed by the leaders of the Allied Armies.
By the beginning of 1916 he had established a mastery in military councils which
was practically as good as the artificial unity of command brought into being at
Doullens and Abbeville in 1918.
The removal of Joffre from command of the French Armies at the end of 1916,
when, after two difficult years, the corner had been turned, was one of the greatest
blunders of the war. His plan for recommencing operations in February gave
place to Nivelle's offensive in April, and with the reprieve thus given them the
Germans slipped back to the Hindenburg Line. There had been time for decisive
action in 1917 with Russia still in the war; now this time had been lost, and the
decision postponed for nearly two years.
It is no small sign of greatness that Joffre made no complaint of his treatment
either by his own voice or pen or by deputy; he had at least the satisfaction of
knowing that he had singled out for rapid promotion, one from Corps Commander
and the other from Colonel, to be commanders of Groups of Armies, the two men
who were to bring the war to a victorious endFoch as Allied Commander-in-Chief,
and Pétain as Commander of the French Armies.
By General Sir Hubert Gough, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
HERE are many causes which led to winning the War, and one was the
capacity for comradeship in all Divisions and units in the Army, and from
that throughout the country.
Comradeship means efficiency. I do not say that it alone is going to win battles,
because military knowledge, equipment, brains and discipline are necessary, but
comradeship is one of the great things, and if it does not reign supreme in the
hearts of an army, that army will never be efficient. It oils the wheels and
soothes the nerves. If, in private life there is friction with those around you, and
not the willingness to give and take, it has bad effect on the nerves, and in the
Great War that question of nerves was almost predominant.
Ludendorf is reported to have said that the nation whose nerve lasted longest
would win the War, and I think he was right. The nation whose nerves did last
the longest, did win the War. However, it is about time we realized what this
country did, and not belittle ourselves. While fully acknowledging the great part
played by our Allies towards final victory, the British Army and people were the
prop, the mainstay, and the pivot of the whole Allied cause. I have often heard it
said that many attacks made by the British were futile and a useless waste of life
that we were stupid, clumsy, bad soldiers, badly led, badly staffed, but brave; that
was acknowledged, but nothing more. I can assure you that nearly every attack
which to our minds might have appeared futile was because we were fighting for an
allywe had to attack to take the pressure off somebody else. We were called upon
often in a very insistent mannerto sacrifice ourselves.
